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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this research is to further develop and refine an existing model 
for forecasting the supply of high-quality male contracts at the Recruiting Sub Station 
level for the Marine Corps. Additional variables that were excluded in the previous model 
will be researched and incorporated to provide a more realistic scenario for the Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command.  This follow on research is necessary because of the rising 
accession missions and increasing recruiter levels.  It is our intent that this forecasting 
information will facilitate recruiting efforts as end strength increases over the course of 
the next two years.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Marine Corps has been authorized by Congress, per the recommendation of 
the President, to increase the active forces1 end strength2 to 202,000 by Fiscal Year (FY) 
2013.  According to the President’s 2008 Budget, the Marines are increasing end strength 
by 14,000 personnel in FY 2008, by 19,000 personnel in FY 2009, by 24,000 personnel 
in FY 2010, and by 27,000 in FY 2011.  The incremental growth of approximately 3,000 
personnel per year will have a tremendous effect on recruiting costs and the 
determination of where to best allocate recruiting resources.   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to further develop and refine an existing model for 
forecasting the supply of high-quality male contracts at the Recruiting Sub-Station (RSS) 
level, which is the lowest level in the Marine Corps Recruiting Command’s chain of 
command.  The thesis investigates several new and hopefully more accurate, variables to 
include in the RSS-level forecasting model.  These variables include more accurate 
civilian wages, veteran population estimates, and advertising expenditures.  Where 
possible these variables are incorporated in the existing model to provide a more accurate 
prediction model for the Marine Corps Recruiting Command.  This research is necessary 
because of the rising accession missions and increasing recruiter levels.  It is our intent 
that this forecasting model will assist policy makers in their assignment and utilization of 
scarce recruiting resources as end strength increases over the course of the next two 
years. 
                                                 
1 Active forces are active duty personnel serving during war and peacetime in the Operating Forces.  
This does not include Marine Corps Reserves.  
2 End Strength is maximum number of personnel a given military service can have at the end of the 
fiscal year (September 30). 
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C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
A review of several previous enlistment supply studies was conducted in an effort 
to isolate the key factors that have been found to be accurate predictors of the production 
of high-quality male contracts across geographic areas and over time.  Although some of 
the studies discussed other branches of the armed forces and were published almost thirty 
years ago, they still provided pertinent information as they focused on variables that are 
believed to directly affect a potential high-quality male’s propensity to enlist. 
In addition to reviewing previously published studies related to our topic, our 
methods of completing this thesis included communication with personnel at the Center 
for Naval Analyses (CNA), the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), and the 
Navy Recruiting Command (NRC).  A review of current forecasting models used within 
the Marine Corps and Navy was done.  We compiled data on United States Marine Corps 
and Department of Defense contract production and then specified and estimated a new 
Marine Corps contract supply model.  We were asked to research the impact an 
advertising variable would have on predicting high-quality male contracts.  This research, 
however, indicated that advertising data was not available at the desired local geographic 
levels (RSS).    Similarly, we investigated the availability of data to estimate an 
enlistment supply model at the zip code or county level and have concluded that this 
would be best suited for follow-on research.         
D.  ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Following this introduction, the literature review in Chapter II surveys numerous 
prior accession studies, the Navy Recruiting Command’s contract supply model and a 
previous Marine Corps contract supply model.  These models are examined and the 
issues relevant to this study are discussed.  In Chapter III, a detailed description of our 
data is provided.  Chapter III also discusses how data was obtained, processed, 
summarized, and arranged in order to estimate our supply model.  The model 
specification is described in detail and further analyzed in our model estimation section in 




Additionally, our proposed hypotheses are addressed.  Finally, our thesis closes with a 
summary of our findings and any recommended areas to be researched that were of 
interest but outside the scope of this study.   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The goal of this thesis is to produce a more dependable and user-friendly model 
that can be utilized by manpower planners to better forecast high-quality male applicants.  
This is especially helpful because it will focus the efforts of the recruiting force at the 
RSS level as it strives to accomplish the goal of increasing force structure over the course 
of the next two years. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PREVIOUS RECRUITING PROGRAM STUDIES 
Numerous prior studies have analyzed military enlistment supply models.  Many 
of these studies used pooled time series, cross-sectional data.  Pooled data increases the 
variation in key variables, such as military pay, civilian pay and unemployment, as 
compared to either cross sectional or time series data alone.  (Hogan et al., 2000).   The 
following section discusses some of the key predictive variables which were used 
extensively in previous studies, which we included in our enlisted supply model.  
1.   USMC Recruiters 
Determining which geographic locations to assign the recently increased number 
of Marine canvassing recruiters in order to obtain more high-quality male contracts is one 
of the underlying purposes of further developing this contract supply model.  The number 
of canvassing recruiters on production is one of the few variables in this model that the 
Marine Corps can control.  Various studies on contract supply models have found that, 
when all other variables are held constant, same-service recruiters have a positive effect 
on the number of high-quality contracts achieved.  Goldhaber’s study states that in 
addition to increasing enlistment rates, recruiters are a “relatively cost effective means of 
increasing supply” (Goldhaber, 1999).  
2.   Other Service Recruiters 
Numerous studies have looked at the effect of other service recruiters operating in 
the same geographical area on a given service’s recruiting success.  The number of other-
service recruiters in a given area appears to complement the recruiting efforts of each 
branch of service.  Individual contracts initiated by a recruiter from any branch of service 
can stimulate and inform eligible individuals about military service in general (Warner, 
1990).  Research by Hostetler (1998), Jarosz and Stephens (1999), and by Hogan et al. 
(2000) found that increases in either the Army or Navy recruiting force in a local 
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geographic area led to increases in other services’ high-quality male contracts.   The 
exception to this finding was noted in Warner’s (1990) study.  He discovered that the 
Marine Corps was the only branch that did not benefit from additional recruiters from 
other services operating in their local area of operations.  However, in most of the other 
studies, the presence of recruiters from other branches appears to be complementary to an 
individual service.        
3. Economic Factors: Military-to-Civilian Pay and the Unemployment 
Rate 
According to Warner’s 1990 study,  
any analysis of military labor supply must begin with the two basic 
economic forces that determine military enlistment; (i) military pay 
relative to civilian wages and (ii) the civilian unemployment rate. (Warner, 
1990, p 48). 
These have proven to be two of the most predictive factors considered when 
determining the supply of high-quality male contracts.  In each study, higher relative 
military pay and increases in unemployment rates have been positively correlated with 
higher rates of enlistment.  Warner’s results varied by service, but he found that a ten 
percent increase in relative pay led to an increase in high-quality contracts ranging 
between 2% and 5%.  Warner’s results for the civilian unemployment rate estimated that 
a 10% increase in the civilian unemployment rate resulted in a 4% to 6% increase in 
high-quality enlistments (Warner, 1990).  The Hostetler (1998) and Jarosz & Stephens 
(1999) studies reported similar results showing a correlation between an increase in the 
unemployment rate and an increase in high-quality male contracts.   
4.   Veteran Population 
Data on local area veteran population has been compiled by the American 
Community Survey (VETPOP).  The VETPOP is described as follows:  
a household survey developed by the Census Bureau as part of the 
decennial program. It is a large demographic survey collected throughout 
the year using mailed questionnaires, telephone interviews, and visits from 
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Census Bureau field representatives to about 3 million household 
addresses annually. Starting in 2005, the VETPOP produced social, 
housing, and economic characteristic data for demographic groups in areas 
with populations of 65,000 or more. (Prior to 2005, the estimates were 
produced for areas with 250,000 or more population.) The VETPOP will 
accumulate sample over three-year and five-year intervals to produce 
estimates for smaller geographic areas, including census tracts and block 
groups. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007) 
The definition of a veteran in the VETPOP is as follows: 
a person 18 years old or over who has served (even for a short time), but is 
not now serving on active duty in the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 
Corps, or the Coast Guard, or who served in the U.S. Merchant Marines 
during World War II. (http://www.bls.gov/lau/vetpopqa.htm)  
The yearly estimates in the VETPOP surveys for the period 2004–2007 show a 
steady decline in the veteran population by state. 
The steady decline of the veteran population in the U.S. is displayed in Table 1. 
This fairly rapid decline is due to the deaths of veterans who served in World War II. 
Table 1.   Percent Veteran Population by State 
Percentage Veteran Population by State       
            
State Census 2000 % VETPOP 2004 % VETPOP 2005 % VETPOP 2006 % VETPOP 2007%
Alabama: 14.0 12.8 12.1 11.8 11.7 
Alaska: 17.0 16.2 16.7 14.6 15.4 
Arizona: 15.0 13.4 12.7 12.4 11.9 
Arkansas: 14.0 13.6 12.8 12.2 11.8 
California: 10.0 8.8 8.6 8 7.7 
Colorado: 14.0 12.5 11.9 11.7 11.4 
Connecticut: 12.0 10.3 10.2 9.7 9.2 
Delaware: 14.0 13.5 12.8 8.5 11.9 
District of 
Columbia: 10.0 8.8 7.9 12.3 7.2 
Florida: 15.0 13.5 12.9 12.5 12.1 
Georgia: 13.0 11.1 11.4 10.7 10.2 
Hawaii: 14.0 12.2 12.7 12.4 12.9 
Idaho: 15.0 13.4 13 12.5 12.1 
Illinois: 11.0 9.5 9.3 8.8 8.3 
Indiana: 13.0 11.3 11.2 10.9 10.3 
Iowa: 13.0 11.5 11.4 11.2 11 
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Kansas: 14.0 12.5 12 11.4 11.2 
Kentucky: 13.0 11.3 11.1 10.7 10.4 
Louisiana: 12.0 11.2 10.4 10.2 9.8 
Maine: 16.0 14.5 14.5 13.7 13.8 
Maryland: 13.0 12.2 11.9 11.2 10.9 
Massachusetts: 12.0 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.7 
Michigan: 12.0 11.1 10.7 10.1 9.8 
Minnesota: 13.0 11 10.8 10.5 10.3 
Mississippi: 12.0 11.1 10.9 9.9 10 
Missouri: 14.0 12.8 12.5 12 11.5 
Montana: 16.0 15.1 14.3 14.2 14 
Nebraska: 14.0 12.5 12.2 11.5 11.3 
Nevada: 16.0 13 13.3 12.8 12.3 
New Hampshire: 15.0 13.2 13.4 12.9 12.1 
New Jersey: 11.0 8.7 8.6 8 7.5 
New Mexico: 15.0 13.2 12.8 12.3 12.2 
New York: 10.0 7.9 7.8 7.4 7 
North Carolina: 13.0 12 11.6 11.4 10.8 
North Dakota: 13.0 11.9 12.4 11.8 11.2 
Ohio: 14.0 12 11.7 11.1 11 
Oklahoma: 15.0 14 13.3 12.5 12.1 
Oregon: 15.0 12.9 12.9 12.4 12.1 
Pennsylvania: 14.0 12.1 11.9 11.2 10.8 
Rhode Island: 13.0 11.8 11.3 9.9 9.8 
South Carolina: 14.0 13 13 12.2 12 
South Dakota: 14.0 13.6 12.2 12.6 12.6 
Tennessee: 13.0 11.7 11.6 11 10.9 
Texas: 12.0 10.5 10.1 9.8 9.4 
Utah: 11.0 9.3 8.5 8.8 8.5 
Vermont: 14.0 13.2 12.3 11.3 11.3 
Virginia: 15.0 14.2 13.9 13.5 13.1 
Washington: 15.0 13.7 13.6 13 12.7 
West Virginia: 14.0 13.8 12.6 12.5 12 
Wisconsin: 13.0 11.3 10.9 10.6 10.5 
Wyoming: 16.0 14.1 14.6 13.9 13.1 
 
Despite the decreased number of veterans, this demographic is very important for 
recruiters.  These veterans serve as influencers for potential high-quality male applicants.  
For example, Hojnowski writes: 
The high correlation between veteran population and the propensity of 
youth to join military service has been repeatedly shown through studies 
conducted during the AVF era.  Decreased veteran population numbers 
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could potentially result in lower predictive capability of the model in 
future years if the variability of these numbers across regions is also 
reduced.  As a result, continued research must be conducted to determine 
the factors which most affect those in the target youth population so that 
not only CNRC’s goaling model, but recruiting efforts in general can be 
focused to meet these new demands. (Hojnowski, 2005) 
The importance of this group of influencers is reflected in the many current 
recruiting advertising commercials.  Television advertisements are focused more on 
appealing to the veterans and other influencers than targeting the potential high-quality 
male applicants directly. For example, Donna Miles writes:  
WASHINGTON, Aug. 30, 2005 - Army advertising aimed at parents, 
teachers, coaches and other adults who influence young people’s decisions 
regarding military service appears to be gaining momentum as part of the 
overall “Army of One” recruiting campaign, the director of the Army’s 
strategic outreach effort said today. The Army launched four new 
commercials in April that specifically target adult influencers, an 
increasing number of whom have never served in the military and don’t 
fully understand it or the benefits of military service, Army Col. Thomas 
Nickerson, of U.S. Army Accessions Command, said during a joint 
interview with the Pentagon Channel and American Forces Press Service 
The program’s goal is for prospective recruits to consider Army service 
and ideally, to enlist, he said, and for their adult influencers to support, 
and ideally, to encourage, that decision. “It focuses on providing 
information to both prospects and influencers and, most importantly, 
encouraging them to seek more information about the tangible and 
intangible benefits of military service,” Nickerson said. 
(Army Recruiting Campaign Focuses on Prospects, Influencers, American 
Forces Press Service, August 30 2005, 
http://www.militaryconnections.com/news_story.cfm?textnewsid=1651) 
Vincent Coppola writes: 
It will also retain “The Few. The Proud. The Marines.” slogan. Upcoming 
efforts will target “influencers” such as veterans, coaches, teachers, 
counselors and parents. “Our work will address the demands of the 
millennial generation—young folks who, more than previous generations, 
have closer relationships with their parents and other role models,” said 
White. An upcoming campaign, “Marines for life,” will go beyond the TV 
ads to target veterans through the Internet, alumni publications and other 
media. The theme: “You never lost your honor. You never lost your 
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courage. You only lost touch. “Another effort (working title: “Proud 
Parents”) will focus on family members, capitalizing on the Corps’ long 
tradition of father-to-son enlistments. “We’re mounting a holistic effort to 
convince these influencers that the Marine Corps is a rewarding 
experience and a good life choice,” said Nelson.  
(U.S. Marines Stand Fast at JWT, Adweek, July 1, 2002, 
http://www.allbusiness.com/marketing-advertising/4197200-1.html) 
5. Advertising 
According to Warner’s 1990 study about military recruiting programs during the 
1980s, the only service for which he consistently observed a positive recruiting effect of 
advertising expenditures was the Army.  As Warner notes, a complicating factor in using 
advertising expenditures in enlistment supply models is that the two variables may be 
simultaneously determined.   
The insignificant or negative estimates for the other services may reflect 
the endogeneity of these services’ advertising and thus should be regarded 
with some suspicion.  However, Dertouzos (1989) also was unable to find 
a positive effect for Navy and Marine Corps advertising. (Warner, 1990, p 
59) 
For example, the Navy Recruiting Command (NRC), describes advertising as “Ill-
behaved” or “challenging data”  because the coefficient of advertising in the Navy’s 
econometric contract supply models often is insignificant or the sign is difficult to 
interpret.  According to NRC analyst, Mr. Rudy Sladyk, NRC’s advertising spending 
variable moves inversely with recruiting success.  When Navy recruiters are successful, 
money is taken away from advertising, but when Navy recruiting becomes difficult, more 
money is spent on advertising.  Because the results of including an advertising variable in 
the contract supply model are counterintuitive, the Navy does not include an advertising 
variable in their enlistment prediction model. (Sladyk, 2008).  The Goldhaber study also 
concludes that endogeneity exists because of “the possibility that there is a correlation 
between the advertising variable and the error term” (Goldhaber, 1999).   
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B. NAVY ENLISTED GOALING MODEL 
1. The Navy’s Current Contract Supply Model 
The beginning of the enlistment supply driven studies occurs around 1970, 
in support of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed 
Force. (Goldberg, 1983).   
The genesis of the Navy’s Enlisted Goaling Model came from these early studies.  
When the draft was replaced by the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the Navy was already 
making inroads to develop an econometric model that would enable it to predict which 
factors contribute to high-quality male enlistments.    The Navy’s model was further 
refined by the latter half of the 1970s after it had compiled an ample amount of historic 
demographic data on the All-Volunteer Force.  This data established the foundation for 
the well-functioning model now used (Welsh, 2008). 
The primary target recruiting demographic used in the Navy’s model is the 
number of high school diploma graduates who scored above the 50th percentile (in 
Categories I through IIIA) on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).  The Navy 
refers to someone in this demographic as an “A-cell” contract.  There are a number of 
reasons why A-cell contracts are so desired by the Navy and for that matter, all of the 
services.  One reason is this demographic group is the most costly for the Navy to recruit 
(due to the time and resources necessary to recruit them).  They are considered “supply 
constrained” as compared to other groups such as category IIIB’s and non-high school 
graduates.  However, they offer the biggest potential benefit to the services and afford the 
greatest flexibility for its manpower planners.  This is because the A-cell contract has 
“the highest program qualification rate, the lowest first-term attrition, the lowest training 
costs, fewer discipline problems, and best career performance”  (NCRC Goal Brief, 
2007).         
In order to forecast contract production for this key group, the Navy’s model 
predicts Male A-cell production as a function of:  past production; recruiters; 
unemployment rates; relative military pay; Male HSDG 1-3A population; enlistment 
bonus; other service recruiters; seasonality and other Naval Recruiting District (NRD) 
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factors to include net contract objective (Sladyk, 2008).  The Navy’s addition of the 
variable net contract objective represents the demand the Navy places on their districts to 
contract a certain number of qualified applicants each month.  
The relative predictive accuracy of the Navy’s Goaling Model stimulated interest 
in the Marine Corps to develop a similar contract supply model.  According to a recent 
study conducted by Hojnowski (2005), the difference between the number of predicted 
and actual contracts in the Navy’s model was only 5.31%.     
The Navy’s model is tailored to work at the NRD level, which is the equivalent of 
the Recruiting Station (RS) for the Marine Corps.  However, the Marine Corps is 
interested in a forecasting model that is tailored to work at a lower tier in the Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command’s chain of command, specifically, at the recruiting sub-
station (RSS) level.  A Marine Corps RSS is the equivalent of the Navy’s recruiting 
stations, which represent the local area recruiting office (Sladyk, 2008). 
C. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING COMMAND ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
The Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command is 
responsible for all subordinate Marine recruiting commands throughout the United States.  
There are four subordinate levels of command.  The areas of responsibility (AOR) are 
divided first into two geographic regions, Eastern Recruiting Region (ERR) and Western 
Recruiting Region (WRR).  The Commanding General at each region is responsible for 
three Marine Corps Recruiting Districts.  ERR is responsible for 1st, 4th, and 6th MCD.  
The Commanding General of WRR is responsible for 8th, 9th, and 12th MCD.  Each of 
the six MCD commanders has eight Recruiting Stations (RSs) within their AOR.  There 
are over six hundred Recruiting Sub-Stations (RSSs) or local recruiting offices 
throughout the U.S.    
The number of RSSs assigned to each of the forty-eight RS commanders will vary 
depending on the geographic size of their AOR.  This study will focus on the lowest level 
within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command’s organizational structure.  The average 
RSS is manned by five recruiters.  On average, four of the five recruiters are  
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considered production recruiters and one is a non-production recruiter (MCRC 
Production Recruiters, 7 July 2008).  The MCRC Areas of Operation are illustrated in 
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Figure 2.   MCRC Area of Operation (RSS Level) 2007 Brief 
 
D.   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, the various military 
branches have sought to determine what factors contribute to high-quality males’ 
decisions to enlist in the military.  Numerous researchers have conducted studies on this 
subject and the pertinent factors they selected have facilitated the creation and further 
refinement of forecasting models that are being utilized today by the services’ recruiting 
planners.   
While an increase in the number of USMC recruiters in a geographic location will 
undoubtedly lead to an increase in high-quality male contracts achieved and is a cost-
effective means to obtain these contracts relative to other recruiting weapons, there are 
many other factors that have a direct effect on the accomplishment of this goal.  When 
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applied to the Department of Defense as an institution, studies have shown that additional 
other-service recruiters in a local area are complementary to high-quality contracts 
achieved by a given branch.  Economic factors weigh heavily in a young male’s decision 
of whether or not to enlist.  When unemployment rates increase and military pay is high, 
relative to civilian wages, the number of high-quality male contracts also increase.  The 
veteran population is also an important factor.  This particular demographic, while a 
powerful influencer upon potential enlistees, is declining across the U.S.   
In an effort to harness their power of influence, many services are now targeting 
this demographic directly in their televised advertising campaigns.  However, the Navy is 
not currently including the advertising variable in their contract supply model because the 
coefficient infers that additional increases in advertising will have a negative effect on 
recruiting, which is counterintuitive.  While the Marine Corps is interested in including 
this variable in its contract supply model, data is not collected at the desired level and, 











The data used in the analysis in this thesis builds upon the data set used by Brian 
Welsh for his thesis, “Marine Corps Contract Supply Model for High-Quality Male 
Enlistment Contracts at the Recruiting Sub-Station Level” (Welsh 2008).  Welsh’s data 
set integrated over twenty separate data files from multiple sources including the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the 2000 Census 
Report, the Bureau of Economic Analyses (BEA) and the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (DFAS).  In addition to Welsh’s data, we incorporated new civilian 
wage data that was provided to the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) by the 
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Corporation, and new veteran population data from the 
American Community Survey (ACS) for the years 2004 through 2007.  The new wage 
and veteran population variables were then merged into Welsh’s original data set.   
The civilian wage data provided by CNA measured usual weekly wages at the 
state and county level and was based on CPS-ORG files.     
One of the new civilian wage variables (wage1) provided by CNA measured 
average wages for males ages 18-to-25 with a high school degree and no college, who are 
currently employed and working no less than twenty hours a week. (CNA, Memorandum 
for the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 2008).  
The second civilian wage variable (wage2) provided by CNA also used CPS-
ORG files and was calculated for individual males ages 18-to-25 with a high school 
degree or some college, who are currently employed and working no less than twenty 
hours a week. (CNA, Memorandum for the Commanding General, Marine Corps 
Recruiting Command, 2008).  These two wage variables proxy for the opportunity cost of 
enlisting.  
The third new variable (vetpop) represents annual estimates of state-level veteran 
population levels.  Utilizing the Multi-User Detection (MUD) Code provided by MCRC, 
we sorted data by state, RSS, county, and Federal Information Processing Standards 
(FIPS), and then replaced twenty-six erroneous FIPS for RSSs in order to align counties 
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geographically with RSSs.  This was done to alleviate potential measurement problems.  
Next, we collapsed the data to the RSS level and merged with Welsh’s file.  FIPS (county 
code), state, and year were utilized as unique identifiers enabling us to merge the new 
civilian wage data and veteran population estimates with Welsh’s original data set at state 
or county level.  The new variables were utilized in the specification of a high-quality 
male enlistment supply model.  Listed below are the descriptions of all data sources that 
were used in the final analysis data set.   
A. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING COMMAND ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
The Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command is 
responsible for all subordinate Marine recruiting commands throughout the United States.  
There are four subordinate levels of command.  The areas of responsibility (AOR) are 
divided first into two geographic regions, Eastern Recruiting Region (ERR) and Western 
Recruiting Region (WRR).  The Commanding General at each region is responsible for 
three Marine Corps Recruiting Districts (MCD).  ERR is responsible for 1st, 4th, and 6th 
MCD, while the Commanding General of WRR is responsible for 8th, 9th, and 12th 
MCD.  Each of the six MCD commanders has eight Recruiting Stations (RSs) within 
their AOR.  The 48 RSs cover over six hundred Recruiting Sub-Stations (RSSs) located 
throughout the U.S.  The number of RSSs assigned to each of the forty-eight RS 
commanders varies depending on the geographic size of their AOR.  This study will 
focus on the lowest level within the Marine Corps Recruiting Command’s organizational 
structure, the RSS level.     
1.   Recruiting Sub-Station Data 
DMDC provided identifiers for all levels of the recruiting structure.  We selected 
the RSS identifier labeled Multi-User Detection (MUD) Code.  The Marine Corps 
Recruiting Command (MCRC) uses this MUD code, which is generated by DMDC, for 
the purposes of identifying the individual RSSs and consolidating month and year 
information on recruiters and contracts by RSS.  In most cases, a county is the 
responsibility of a single RSS.  However, in some circumstances, an outlying high school 
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in the same county may be canvassed by another RSS.  This would mean a single county 
is being covered by more than one RSS.  Each county is assigned an individual FIPS 
code.  When more than one RSS shared a single FIPS code, we chose to align the county-
level FIPS code with the RSS that canvassed the majority of the high schools therein.  In 
practice, the area of responsibility assigned to an RSS could cross county lines.  In 
theory, however, for our models, we used the county-level FIPS code to identify each 
RSS territory.3.  
B.  RECRUIT MARKETING INFORMATION SYSTEM (RMIS) 
The necessity of providing a model to forecast high-quality male applicants at the 
RSS level is heightened as the Marine Corps strives to overcome increased recruiting 
challenges with a looming 2011 deadline to complete the increase in overall force 
structure.  The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and the Marine Corps 
Recruiting Command (MCRC) facilitated the collection of data reported at the RSS-level 
by granting access to the Recruit Management Information System (RMIS).  RMIS, uses 
and Internet-based version of the Recruit Network mainframe system providing 
information in Oracle data tables to support recruiting efforts (RMIS Users Guide, 2007).  
We extracted the Recruit Marketing Information System (RMIS) file in Welsh 
(2008), which contained monthly RSS-level recruiter contract and population data for the 
period October 2002 through June 2007.  Figure 3 below lays out the RMIS data merging 
process (Welsh, 2008, p 19). 
                                                 
3 The following RSSs in our model were associated with erroneous FIPS codes: Aleutians East and 
Skagway Hoonah-Angoon, AK,  Fulton, AR,  Gila and Pima, AZ,  Alameda, Napa, Riverside, and San 
Bernardino, CA,  Honolulu and Pearl City, HI,  Blaine, ID,  Washington, IN,  Sanilac and Saginaw, MI, 
Carver, MN, Greene and Saint Louis, MO, Klamath, OR, Cameron, PA, Bell, TX, Kane, UT, Loudoun, 





























Figure 3.   RMIS Merged Data Flow Chart (Welsh, 2008, p 20) 
1.  Contract and Recruiter Data 
Two data files were extracted from RMIS and consisted of Department of 
Defense (DoD) contract data and DoD recruiters data.  Using a year and month identifier 
in conjunction with the RSS identifier, the contract and recruiter data was merged with 
the USMC files, provided by MCRC into a single DoD file.  The data in this file includes 
every high-quality male applicant contract signed by year, month, and per RSS for each 
branch of the armed forces for the period FY03 to the third quarter of FY07 (Welsh, 
2008, p 21).  However, the second quarter of FY03 and the fourth quarter of FY07 were 
not available in the RMIS records when this data was extracted. 
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C.  COUNTY-LEVEL DATA  
1.  Unemployment Rate 
The unemployment rate is one of the key factors in predicting the number of high-
quality male contracts.  For this study, county-level unemployment data for the years 
2003 through 2007, by quarter, was retrieved from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
(BLS) website.  First, by using a year identifier and a FIPS (Federal Information 
Processing Standards) state/county code identifier, all data files were merged.  The 
quarterly average of county-level data was sorted by FIPS and then merged for each RSS 
(Welsh, 2008, p 23). 
2.  Civilian Youth Population Data 
The Department of Defense contracts with Woods and Poole Economics, 
Incorporated to supply annual estimates of local area population.  We extracted these 
estimates through the RMIS to obtain information on civilian youth population.  More 
specifically, we obtained estimates for 17- to 24-year-old males who scored in Categories 
I-IIIA on the AFQT.  Additionally, at a minimum, this sample had earned a high school 
diploma, and at a maximum, had taken some college courses.  Using MUD codes from 
FY04 to the third quarter of FY07, the data was consolidated at the RSS level (Welsh, 
2008, p 22). 
D.  STATE-LEVEL DATA 
Although the intent was to collect data at the county/RSS level, only state-level 
data was available for the veteran population and the civilian wages.  We merged this 
state-level information by year to our data.   
1.  Veteran Population Data 
Veteran population data for the years 2004 through 2007 was compiled by the 
American Community Survey (ACS).  The ACS is a household survey developed by the 
Census Bureau. It is a large demographic survey run annually collecting information on 
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approximately three million households. Post 2005, social, housing, and economic 
characteristic data for demographic groups in areas with populations of 65,000 or more 
were produced by the ACS. (Prior to 2005, the estimates were produced for areas with 
250,000 or more population.).4  From the ACS we extracted the veteran population at the 
county level (vetpop) and merged it with the rest of our data by state, FIPS code, and 
year.  
2.  Civilian Wage Data 
Civilian wage data was compiled by CNA for the 18-to 25-year-old male 
population from 2004 through 2007. All wage measures are based on the CPS ORG files.  
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is the monthly household survey conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics to measure labor force participation and employment.  The 
CPS surveys 50,000 to 60,000 households per month.  All households are interviewed 
each month for four months, then ignored for eight months, then interviewed again for 
four more months.  Usual weekly hours/earnings questions are asked only in the fourth 
and eighth month interviews.  These outgoing interviews (also known as the Outgoing 
Rotation Group (ORG) files) are used to construct wage estimates.  New households 
enter each month, so one-fourth of the households are in an outgoing rotation each 
month.  CNA used the CPS ORG data to produce year-specific estimates of civilian 
wages from 2004 through 2007.  The sample was limited to males ages 18 to 25, 5 
excluding those who dropped out of high school or earned a  GED, as well as those who 
earned a college degree (either a two-year or four-year degree.)  CNA included only 
those who are currently employed.  Weights are used to make estimates reflective of the 
U.S. population.  The CPI-U-RS inflation series (Consumer Price Index Research Series 
Using Current Methods) is utilized to inflate all wages to 2007 dollars.  CNA was able to 
estimate common weekly wages in each case (CNA, Memorandum for the Commanding 
General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 2008). 
                                                 
4 This information can be obtained at (http://www.bls.gov/lau/vetpopqa.htm). 
5 (National Bureau of Economic Research, www.nber.org/data/morg.html).   
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E.  OTHER DATA: MILITARY PAY 
The average entry pay data for pay grades E-1 to E-3 was extracted from annual 
military pay charts and then calculated for each year for the period FY03 through FY07.  
Although military pay does not vary, it was collected and merged by year with each data 


























Figure 4.   Final Master Data Set Merge Flow Chart 
 
F.  VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
The final data file “Master Merged data file” in Figure 4 is used to estimate the 
econometric supply model. In addition to variables used by Welsh, we added new 
variables to improve the recruitment predictions.  Table 2 contains a list of the key 
variables and a description of each.  
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Table 2.   Glossary of Variables 
Variable Identification Table   
    
Variable Name Description of Variable 
    
RSS1 Recruiting sub station identifier 
year years 2004 through 2007 
qtr qtrs 1 through 4 within years 2004 through 2007 
Dodprodtotal  total number of DoD recruiters 
usmcprodtotal total number USMC recruiters 
usmcmalecontracts total number USMC male contracts 17 to 24-year-old 
males 
usmcallcontracts total number USMC contracts years 2004 to 2007 
youthpop 17 to 24-year-old male High School Seniors through 4 
year degree holders scoring in Category I-IIIA on the 
AFQT by RSS by year 
vet_percent 2000 Census veteran population 
wage 
County Manufacturing Wage average for 2003 
through 2006 and State Manufacturing wage for 2007 
ur  
County Unemployment Rate for 2003 through 2007  
wage1avg State-level wages, 18 to 25-year-old males with a high 
school degree and no college & employed >= 20 
hrs/week 
wage2avg State-level wages, 18 to 25-year-old males with a high 
school degree or some college & employed >= 20 
hrs/week 
vetpop State-level veteran population  
milpay 
E1 to E3 average annual wage by year 2003 to 2007 
wage1avgyearly State-level wages, 18 to 25-year-old males with a high 
school degree and no college, annual (avg x 52wks) 
wage2avgyearly State-level wages, 18 to 25-year-old males with a high 
school degree or some college annual (avg x 52wks) 
log_milcivpay1 Natural log of milcivpay1 variable 
log_milcivpay2 Natural log of milcivpay2 variable 
milcivpay milpay variable divided by wage variable 
log_milcivpay Natural log of milcivpay variable 
log_vet_percent natural log of veteran_percent variable 
log_youthpop natural log of youthpop variable 
log_vetpop Natural log of vetpop variable  
log_ur Natural log of ur variable 
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irss1 through 582 Dummy variables for each of the 582 Recruiting Sub 
Stations 
year_2004 Dummy variable for year 2004 
year_2005 Dummy variable for year 2005 
year_2006 Dummy variable for year 2006 
year_2007 Dummy variable for year 2007 
qtr_1 Dummy variable for qtr 1 
qtr_2 Dummy variable for qtr 2 
qtr_3 Dummy variable for qtr 3 
qtr_4 Dummy variable for qtr 4 
usmcprodtotal_percapita usmcprodtotal variable divided by youthpop variable 
log_usmcprodtotal_percapita Natural log of usmcprodtotal_percapita variable 
dodprodtotal_percapita dodprodtotal variable divided by youthpop variable 
log_dodprodtotal_percapita Natural log of dodprodtotal_percapita variable  
usmcmalecontracts_percapita usmcmalecontracts variable divided by youthpop 
variable 
log_usmcmalecontracts_percapita 
natural log of usmcmalecontracts_percapita variable 
usmcallcontracts_percapita usmcallcontracts variable divided by youthpop 
variable 
log_usmcallcontracts_percapita Natural log of usmcallcontracts_percapita variable 
log_usmcprodtotal Natural log usmcprodtotal variable 
log_dodprodtotal natural log dodprodtotal variable 
log_usmcmalecontracts Natural log usmcmalecontracts 
log_usmcallcontracts Natural log usmcallcontracts 
 
Using FIPS code and quarter data from the first quarter of FY04 through the third 
quarter of FY07, all observations were merged by fiscal year to the RSS level.  Table 3 
presents the summary statistics. 
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Table 3.   Summary Statistics of key variables at the RSS level 
Final Consolidated, Post-Collapsed 
Summary Statistics (Wage1 & 
Wage2)           
            
Variable         Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
RSS1 8122 291.5276 167.935 1 582 
year 8122 2005.5 1.052173 2004 2007 
qtr 8122 2.428712 1.115607 1 4 
Dodprodtotal  8122 51.89041 23.49741 2.099 237.405 
usmcprodtotal   8122 12.86647 5.231171 0.456 52.95 
usmcmalecontracts 8122 11.35336 7.295105 0 120 
dodprodtotal_percapita 8122 0.1317822 0.1073889 0.0007118 1.172326 
usmcprodtotal_percapita 8122 0.0322838 0.0252148 0.0001643 0.2519399 
usmcmalecontracts_percapita 8122 0.0286683 0.028315 0 0.6519194 
youthpop 8122 604.3662 430.4017 59.11653 3896 
ur 8119 5.175517 1.299508 2.15 15.8 
wage1avgyearly 8122 24563.14 2083.139 18870.28 39889.2 
wage2avgyearly 8122 25538.34 1938.862 20650.24 38001.08 
vetpop 8122 10.79197 1.82377 7 16.7 
milpay 8122 16007.12 707.4509 15126.3 17178 
 
 
We were able to successfully merge 8,122 total observations after adding in the 
new variables and correcting inaccuracies in FIPS codes for twenty-six counties. Missing 
observations found within the Master Merge Data File were dropped.  The remaining 
8,122 observations were used to estimate the Marine Corps’ Enlisted Supply Model for 
high-quality male applicants. 
Table 3 shows the means of the variables.  In each RSS, on average, there are 
thirteen USMC canvassing recruiters on production and fifty-two recruiters from other 
services in the same area competing for the same high-quality male contracts.    Since on 
average each RSS has about thirteen production recruiters, each recruiter writes about 
eleven contracts per quarter.  The average unemployment rate is 5.17% and the average 
yearly state-level wage is between $24,563 and $25,538 depending on the wage estimate 
used. The USMC canvassing recruiters will have to work hard to convince these potential 
applicants that serving their country has more benefits beyond the average starting salary 
of $16,007.  The veteran population is also important to recruiters because of its potential 
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to influence these high-quality male applicants.  Approximately 10.79% of the population 
within a RSS area of operations is made up of veterans.     
G.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The data set used in this research combined our new civilian wage variables and 
veteran population variable with data used by Welsh.  Our Master Merge Data File is the 
result of consolidating data from more than twenty data files from various sources.  To 
accomplish this, we used the RSS variable and a time variable as the unique identifiers.  
Once all data were merged, the new final data set was utilized to estimate our models. 
 28 
 




IV.  MODEL ESTIMATION 
The data discussed in Chapter III were used to specify and estimate eight different 
regression models.  This chapter explains the specifications of each model and presents 
and discusses the results.  Our main model is estimated using a fixed effects technique.  
The model incorporates our two new wage variables and a new veteran population 
variable and is based upon the original model developed by Welsh (2008).  
A.  MODELS 
In order to discover how specific independent variables affect the number of high-
quality male contracts (our dependent variable), we created and analyzed eight different 
versions of the basic econometric contract supply model.  Our first four models use as the 
dependent variable the number of high-quality male contracts divided by the local (RSS) 
youth population.  Models 5–8 predict total contracts, rather than per-capita contracts.  
Dummy variables for Recruiter Sub Stations (RSS) were included in some of the models 
to obtain fixed effects estimates. These RSS dummy variables account for unobserved (to 
the researchers) local factors and influences that affect recruiting conditions and vary 
across geographic areas but that are fixed over time.  These conditions are not observed 
and therefore are captured by the error term in models not including dummies for each 
RSS.  If these unobservable factors are correlated with the independent variables, the 
estimated coefficients can be biased.  For example, propensity toward military service is 
known to vary across geographic areas, but we have no measure of true military 
propensity. Fixed effects techniques is one method for dealing with the bias that 
unobserved propensity would induce in recruitment estimates.  Each individual model 
was estimated both with and without fixed effects to determine the robustness of the 
estimated coefficients (elasticities) to the estimating technique.  
B.  MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
In our models, the dependent variable was specified as either total Marine high-
quality male contracts or as Marine high-quality male contracts per capita of youth 
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population.  The main reason for using the per capita specification is to adjust the model 
for potential heteroskedasticity arising from high recruitment numbers associated with 
highly populated areas (Wooldridge, p. 57, 2006). In the latter specification, independent 
variables that also tend to vary by local area population, such as the number of recruits, 
also were adjusted by the youth population.  We controlled for year and quarter fixed 
effects in order to take care of fluctuations over time in economic conditions or other 
variables that affect all RSSs in the same way, as well as seasonal effects, such as length 
of school year.   
The Models are specified in the general equation as depicted in Equation (1): 
i i i iN Xτ τ τβ δ ε= ∗ + +      (1) 
Where Niτ is the number of high-quality male contracts produced in a fiscal-year quarter, 
and Xiτ represents a vector of explanatory variables, which include Marine recruiters, 
other service recruiters, youth population, the unemployment rate, and the military-to-
civilian pay ratio.  The term iδ  represents the fixed effects, which are accounted for by 
the RSS dummy variables, and iτε  represents a random error term.  
The fixed effects contract supply model is specified in log-log functional form.  
This model specification is illustrated in Equation (2): 
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+ +∂ ∑ +
           (2)  
Where ‘log_usmcmalecontracts_percapita’ is the natural logarithm of high-quality male 
contracts per capita produced in a fiscal-year quarter, and 1β  through 11β  represent the 
coefficients on explanatory variables, which include Marine recruiters per capita, DoD 
recruiters per capita, the unemployment rate,  military-to-civilian pay ratio, and veteran 
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population.  The RSS fixed effects are accounted for by the RSS dummy variables.  Year 
and quarter dummies account for time fixed effects. 
The log-log specification yields coefficients that have the elasticity interpretation.  
More specifically, a one percent change in a particular independent variable (Xi) results 
in β  percent change in the dependent variable, holding all other independent variables in 
the model constant.  
Equation (3) estimates models where the dependent variable represents total 
quarterly RSS contracts (vice per capita contracts in model (2).  Youth population was 
entered in the model to control for size of the local market area.  This specification is 
shown below: 
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           (3) 
Where ‘log_usmcmalecontracts’ of high-quality male contracts produced in a fiscal-year 
quarter, and 1β  through 12β  represent the coefficients on explanatory variables as in 
equation (2).  
In our models, RSS-level data on the dependent variable (high-quality male 
contracts) was collected for 14 quarters from fiscal year 2004 (FY04) through fiscal year 
2007 (FY07).  Data for the second quarter of FY04 and the fourth quarter of FY07 are 
missing and were not included in the analysis sample.   
C.  HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS  
Based on the literature review in Chapter two, increases in the following key 
variables are expected to have a positive effect on high-quality male contracts: the local 
unemployment rate, the military-civilian pay ratio, the number of canvassing Marine 
Recruiters, and the number of military veterans (influencers) residing in the local area.  
For example, young males are more likely to consider serving in the military when local 
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unemployment rates increase, opportunities for civilian employment decrease, and when 
military pay is equal to or better than civilian pay, all else equal.  An increase in the 
number of canvassing recruiters enables the military to contact more eligible candidates 
for military service.  Previous studies have shown that areas with higher veteran 
populations tend to have a larger number of eligible applicants.  Veterans can influence 
the younger generation to serve in the military.   
Quarterly contract data covering a 4-year period 2004-2007 for 582 recruiting sub 
stations (RSS) was used to estimate all of the models.  The final analysis data set 
contained 8,047 observations.  Seventy five observations were lost due to incomplete 
merges of data.  The description of the variables used in estimating the models was 
presented above in Chapter 3, Table 2, and descriptive statistics were presented in Table 
3.  
D.  DISCUSSION OF MODEL RESULTS  
1. Fixed Effects Contract Supply Model with Milcivpay1 
We estimate four per capita contract models in order to analyze the recruitment 
influencers and observe any differences in the supply models when the new wage and 
veteran population variables are added to the models previously estimated in Welsh 
(2008).  The results of the estimates of the four model specifications are presented in 
Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7.  Table 4 shows the results of the Contract Supply Model that uses 
the new Milcivpay1 variable.   
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Table 4.   Fixed Effects Contract Supply Model with  Milcivpay1(dependent variable = log 
high-quality male contracts per capita) 


























Number of RSS dummy variables 582 




Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The following key variables have a positive effect on high-quality male contracts: 
the number of Marine recruiters, the number of other-service recruiters, the 
unemployment rate, the military civilian pay ratio, and the veteran population. These five 
variables all have positive coefficients suggesting that increases in these variables will 
lead to an increased number of high-quality male contracts for the Marine Corps.  
Specifically, a 1% increase in the USMC recruiters is estimated to increase the high-
quality male contracts per local youth population by 0.875%.  This is significant at the 
1% level. Furthermore, a 1% increase in the unemployment rate is estimated to increase 
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the high-quality male contracts per local youth population by 0.049% (significant at the 
1% level). Lastly, a 1% increase in the military-to-civilian pay ratio is estimated to 
increase high-quality male contracts per local youth population by 0.026%. This is 
significant at the 10% level.  The estimates in Table 4 confirm that additional recruiters, 
increased military pay and a higher unemployment rate all contribute to an increase in 
high-quality male contracts.  Although the number of other-service recruiters is positive, 
it is not significant at any acceptable level.  The quarterly data provided in Table 4, 
confirms that, compared to the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, fewer high-quality male 
applicants enlist during the second quarter (February through May).  Another intuitive 
finding is that when compared to the fourth quarter, the highest percentages of high-
quality male applicants choose to enlist during the third quarter of the fiscal year (June 
through September), immediately following high school graduation.  
2.   Contract Supply Model without RSS Fixed Effects 
The previous literature suggests that the model specified in Table 4 is the 
preferred model.  However, to test for robustness, the model was re-estimated omitting 
RSS fixed effects.  By eliminating the fixed effects for RSS, the possibility of generating 
biased results increased because there are no controls for differences in propensity or 
other unobservables across geographic areas.  Table 5 presents the results of the model.   
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Table 5.   Contract Supply Model without RSS Fixed Effects (dependent variable = log 
high-quality male contracts per capita) 



























Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The results in Table 5 are similar to those in Table 4. However, there are some 
differences between the two sets of results.  In particular, the unemployment rate in Table 
5 estimates a 1% increase in the unemployment rate is estimated to increase the high-
quality male contracts per local youth population by 0.0078%.  This is significant at the 
5% level.  Table 4 estimates a 1% increase in the unemployment rate is estimated to 
increase the high-quality male contracts per local youth population by 0.049%.  This is 
significant at the 1% level.  The change in the magnitude of the effect of the 
unemployment rate is due to the omission of RSS fixed effects, which must be highly 
correlated with local economic conditions.  
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The estimates in Table 5 suggest that a 1% increase in the veteran population will 
increase high-quality male contracts per local youth population by 0.04%.  This is 
significant at the 1% level.  This is a slight change from the 0.03% estimate obtained in 
Table 4. The change in the size of the coefficient of the veteran population variable 
suggests that this variable also picks up some of the effect of propensity that was 
captured by the RSS dummy variables in Table 4.   
3.  Fixed Effects Contract Supply Model with Milcivpay2 
Table 6 shows the results when the second civilian wage variable, milcivpay2, is 




Table 6.   Fixed Effects Contract Supply Model with alternative pay variable (dependent 
variable = log high-quality male contracts per capita) 


























Number of RSS dummy variables 
included 
582 
R-squared  0.48 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The results in Table 6 indicate a 1% increase in the USMC recruiters is estimated 
to increase the high-quality male contracts per local youth population by 0.875%.  This 
effect is significant at the 1% level.  Table 6 also indicates a 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate is estimated to increase high-quality male contracts per local youth 
population by 0.0488%.  This effect is also significant at the 1% level.  In comparison to 
Table 4 the military-civilian pay ratio maintains a positive coefficient in Table 6 but is 
not significant at any level below 10%.  In Table 4 the coefficient of military-civilian pay 
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ratio indicates that a 1% increase in the military-civilian pay ratio is estimated to increase 
high-quality male contract production by 0.026% holding all other variables constant.  
This is statistically significant at the 10% level.  The size of the coefficient drops from 
0.02645% in Table 4 to 0.01563% in Table 6, which indicates that including individuals 
with some college in civilian wage estimation strongly affects the predicted effect of 
military-civilian pay ratio on high-quality recruitments.  In Tables 4 and 6, a 1% increase 
in the USMC recruiters coefficient results in a 0.88% increase in the number of high-
quality male contracts produced (holding all other variables constant) and is significant at 
the 1% level in both tables.  Additionally, a 1% increase in the unemployment rate 
coefficient results in a 0.049% increase in the number of high-quality male contracts 
produced (holding all other variables constant) and is significant at the 1% level in both 
tables.  
4.  Contract Supply Model without RSS Fixed Effects  
When comparing results in Table 7 to results in Table 6, we found the following 
statistically significant differences in the variables:  In Table 6 the coefficient of 
unemployment rate indicates that a 1% increase in the unemployment rate is estimated to 
increase high-quality male contracts production by 0.049% holding all other variables 
constant.  This is statistically significant at the 1% level.  The size of the coefficient drops 
from 0.049% in Table 6 to 0.008% in Table 7 where it is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  The military/civilian pay ratio is not statistically significant in Table 6.  However, 
in Table 7, a 1% increase to the military/civilian pay ratio indicates a 0.023% increase in 
high-quality male contracts produced holding all other variables constant.  This is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  This indicates that the predicted coefficients of 
local area variables may be quite misleading when not controlling for RSS fixed effects.  
The veteran population coefficient, although positive, is not statistically significant at any 
level below 10% in Table 6.  However, in Table 7, a 1% increase in veteran population 
indicates a 0.04% increase in high-quality male contracts produced holding all other 
variables constant.  This is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 7.   Contract Supply Model (alternative pay variable) without RSS Fixed Effects 
(dependent variable = log high-quality male contracts per capita) 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
5. Fixed Effects Total Contracts Supply Model with Milcivpay1 
Unlike the previous four models, the next four models do not adjust contracts or 
recruiters for local area population size.  The dependent variable now consists of total 
RSS contracts by quarter, by year.  The log-log specification is used, and the log of area 
youth population is entered as an independent variable.  Table 8 presents the results. 
 





























Table 8.   Fixed Effects Total Contracts Supply Model (dependent variable = log total high-
quality male contracts) 




























Number of RSS1 582 
R-squared  0.39 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
In this model, as in the population-adjusted model in Table 4, the following key 
variables had a positive effect on high-quality male contracts: number of Marine 
recruiters, unemployment rate, military vs. civilian pay, and veteran population.  In Table 
8, the coefficients of the number of Marine recruiters, youth population and 
unemployment rate are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Youth population has a 
negative coefficient which seems puzzling.  However, in this model specification the 
coefficient on youth population represents the effect of population holding constant the 
number of recruiters.  Thus, as population grows, but the number of recruiters is fixed, a 
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certain percentage of the youth population is not being contacted by recruiters in the RSS.  
The military-civilian pay ratio (Milcivpay1) has a coefficient that is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  The coefficient of the number of other-service recruiters, 
although negative, is not significant at any level below 10%.   
When comparing Table 8 to Table 4, we found similarities and differences 
between the variables.  The unemployment rate is statistically significant in both Table 8 
and 4 at the 1% level.  However, the coefficients for the unemployment rate, the military-
civilian pay ratio (Milcivpay1) and the veteran population in Table 8 are larger than they 
are in Table 4.  The coefficient of Marine recruiters in Table 8 was almost a mirror image 
of the results in Table 4.  The coefficient of other-service recruiters is not statistically 
significant in Table 8, as in Table 4, but it now has a negative coefficient. 
In Table 8, the findings for the youth population variable seem counterintuitive.  
The coefficient of youth population indicates that a 1% increase in the youth population 
is estimated to decrease high-quality male contract production by 0.021% holding all 
other variables constant.  This is statistically significant at the 1% level. This could be 
attributed to a youth population growing disproportionately faster than the size of the 
USMC recruiting force at the RSS level.   
6. Total Contracts Supply Model without RSS Fixed Effects 
This model is similar to Table 8 but omits RSS fixed effects. The model results 
are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9.   Total Contracts Supply Model without RSS Fixed Effects (dependent variable = 
log total high-quality male contracts) 





























Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
When comparing Table 9 to Table 8, we find several differences in parameter 
estimates.   Although the estimates for the other-service recruiters in Table 9 are not 
statistically significant at any level below 10%, they do support the concept of 
complementary efforts (which is described later in this chapter) between recruiters from 
different branches of service who operate within the same area.  When omitting RSS 
fixed effects in Table 9 the youthpop variable becomes insignificant, suggesting that local 
area demographics may be correlated with RSS characteristics and perhaps manning and 
advertising.    
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In Table 9, the coefficient of unemployment rate indicates that a 1% increase in 
the local unemployment rate is estimated to increase high-quality male contract 
production by 0.05%, holding all other variables constant.  This is statistically significant 
at the 5% level.  In Table 8, however, the coefficient of unemployment rate indicates that 
a 1% increase in unemployment rate is estimated to increase high-quality male contract 
production by 0.3% holding all other variables constant.  This is statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  Again, this suggests the importance of accounting for RSS-level variation 
unobserved to us, which may be correlated with local unemployment.   
In Table 9, the coefficient of military-civilian pay ratio indicates that a 1% 
increase in the military pay relative to civilian pay is estimated to increase high-quality 
male contract production by 0.18% holding all other variables constant.  This is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  However, when including RSS fixed effects, a 
1% increase in military-civilian pay ratio is estimated to increase high-quality male 
contract production by 0.16% holding all other variables constant.  It is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.   
In Table 9, the coefficient of veteran population indicates that a 1% increase in 
the local veteran population is estimated to increase high-quality male contract 
production by 0.27% holding all other variables constant.  This is statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  However, in Table 8, when including RSS fixed effects, a 1% increase in 
veteran population is estimated to increase high-quality male contract production by 
0.15% holding all other variables constant.  It is statistically insignificant below the 10% 
level.   
7. Fixed Effects Total Contracts Model with Milcivpay2  
Table 10 substitutes the wage variable Milcivpay2 for milcivpay1 in Table 8.  The 
dependent variable now consists of total RSS contracts by quarter, by year.  The log-log 




Table 10.   Fixed Effects Total Contracts Model with alternative pay variable (dependent 
variable = log total high-quality male contracts) 




























Number of RSS1 582 
R-squared  0.39 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
When comparing Table 10 to Table 8, we find the following differences.  The 
military-civilian pay ratio maintains a positive sign in Table 10, but is not significant.  In 
Table 8 the military-civilian pay ratio is statistically significant at the 10% level.  This 
suggests the importance of accounting for RSS-level variation unobserved to us, which 
may be correlated with local pay ratios.    
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8. Total Contracts Supply Model without RSS Fixed Effects 
The model in Table 11 is similar to that in Table 10, with the exception that it is 
not estimated with RSS fixed effects.  
 
Table 11.   Total Contracts Supply Model without RSS Fixed Effects (dependent variable = 
log total high-quality male contracts) 





























Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
When comparing Table 11 to Table 10, we find the following statistically 
significant differences in variables:  the number of other-service recruiters is not 
statistically significant but has a positive coefficient in Table 11 and a negative 
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coefficient in Table 10.  Youth population no longer has a negative coefficient, nor is it 
statistically significant compared to Table 10.  The unemployment rate is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in Table 11, showing a change from Table 10 where its 
statistical significance was at the 1% level.  The military/civilian pay ratio is found to be 
statistically significant at the 5% level in Table 11 whereas in Table 10, it is not 
statistically significant.  Veteran population in Table 11 has a 1% statistical significance 
level versus Table 10 that shows no statistical significance below the 10% level.    
9. Summary of Recruiter Effects 
Table 12 is a summary of the effects of Marine recruiters on high-quality male 
contracts, measured as elasticities, as estimated by all eight models.  The Marine recruiter 
variable possessed the largest elasticity of any of the independent variables in the models.  











Per Capita Model 
w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 4 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran 
Population, RSS, Year, Qtr .8752*** .8626*** 
Per Capita Model 
w/o RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 5 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran 
Population .8768*** .8788*** 
Per Capita Model 
w/alt. pay var. 
w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 6 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran 
Population, RSS, Year, Qtr .8754*** .8626*** 
Per Capita Model 
w/alt. pay var. w/o 
RSS Fixed Effects 
Table 7 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran 





Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population, 
RSS, Year, Qtr .8738*** .8625*** 
Total Contracts 
Model w/o RSS 
Fixed Effects 
Table 9 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population .8861*** .8890*** 
Total Contracts 
Model w/alt. pay 
var. w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 10 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population, 
RSS, Year, Qtr .8738*** .8625*** 
Total Contracts 
Model w/alt. pay 
var. w/o RSS 
Fixed Effects 
Table 11 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population .8863*** .8890*** 
(a)Welsh(2008) 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
In all specified models, the number of Marine recruiters was estimated to be 
significant at the 1% level.  In this thesis the elasticity for the Marine recruiters variable 
ranges between .87% and .89%.  Both primary models presented in Table 4 and Table 6, 
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show that a 10% increase in the number of Marine recruiters in the local area will 
increase the number of high-quality male contracts by 8.75%.  This elasticity is slightly 
higher than those estimated by Welsh and more than double the estimate in the 2008 
Navy model (Sladyk, 2008).  We conclude that with the present manning of RSSs, 
assigning additional recruiters will increase enlistments more than any other intervention.  
10. Summary of Unemployment Rate Effects 
Table 13 is a summary of the elasticity of the unemployment rate on high-quality 
male contracts as estimated in all eight models in this thesis. 
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Per Capita Model 
(Milcivpay1) 
W/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 4 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran 
Population, RSS, Year, Qtr .0497*** .0324*** 
Per Capita Model 
(Milcivpay1) W/O 
RSS Fixed Effects 
Table 5 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran 
Population .0078** 0.0049 
Per Capita Model 
(Milcivpay2) 
W/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 6 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran 
Population, RSS, Year, Qtr .0488*** .0324*** 
Per Capita Model 
(Milcivpay2) W/O 
RSS Fixed Effects 
Table 7 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran 





Effects Table 8 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, 




RSS Fixed Effects 
Table 9 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 





Effects Table 10 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, 




RSS Fixed Effects 
Table 11 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population .0495** .0334* 
(a)Welsh(2008) 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 




In all specified models in this thesis, the unemployment rate was significant at the 
5% level or less.  Unemployment rate elasticities range between .008% and .30%.  Both 
primary models in Table 4 and Table 6, predict that a 10% change in the local area 
unemployment rate increases the number of high-quality male contracts by 0.48% to 
0.49%.  These elasticities are approximately 0.16 percentage points higher than those 
found in Welsh (2008) and a quarter of what was found in the Navy model (2.2%) 
(Sladyk, 2008).   
11. Summary of Military-to-Civilian Pay Elasticity 
Table 14 is a summary of the elasticity of the military-to-civilian pay ratio 
estimated by all eight models.  Two alternative military-to-civilian pay ratios were used 
in the models.  These variables are identified as milcivpay1 and milcivpay2.  Milcivpay1 
utilizes E1 to E3 average annual pay by year 2003 to 2007 and state-level civilian wages 
for 18-25-year-old males with a high school degree and no college.  Milcivpay2 utilizes 
E1 to E3 average annual pay by year 2003 to 2007 and state-level civilian wages for 18-












Per Capita Model 
w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 4 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD recruiters/per 
capita, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, Year, Qtr .0264* 1.0080 
Per Capita Model 
w/o RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 5 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD recruiters/per 
capita, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population .0266** .0683 
Per Capita Model 
w/alt. pay var. 
w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 6 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD recruiters/per 
capita, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, Year, Qtr .0156 1.0080 
Per Capita Model 
w/alt. pay var. w/o 
RSS Fixed Effects 
Table 7 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD recruiters/per 
capita, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population .0236** .0683 
Total Contracts 
Model w/RSS 
Fixed Effects Table 
8 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, 
Year, Qtr .1601* 5.9743 
Total Contracts 
Model w/o RSS 
Fixed Effects Table 
9 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population .1753*** 0.5126 
Total Contracts 
Model w/alt. pay 
var. w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 10 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, 
Year, Qtr .1223 5.9743 
Total Contracts 
Model w/alt. pay 
var. w/o RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 11 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population .1646** 0.5126 
(a)Welsh(2008) 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
       ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The military-to-civilian pay ratio elasticity is statistically significant at less than 
the 10% level in all but two models and ranges between .016% and .18%.  The primary 
models, Table 4 and Table 6, differ considerably in their estimates with the elasticity 
coefficient in Table 4 being larger and statistically significant.  According to Table 4, a 
10% change in the military-to-civilian pay ratio would result in a .26% change in high-
quality male contracts.  Yet, Table 6 indicates a 10% change in the military-to-civilian 
pay ratio would result in approximately a .16% change in high-quality male contracts.  
The results found in this thesis are not in the range reported in Warner (1990).  Warner’s 
(1990) report estimated a 10% change in relative pay would equate to a 5% - 25% change 
in high-quality enlistments all else equal.  Still, Sladyk’s 2008 Navy model finds a 10% 
change in the military-to-civilian pay ratio would result in approximately a 1.8% percent 
change in high-quality enlistments all else equal.  
12. Summary of Other Other-Service Recruiter Effects 
Table 15 shows a summary of the number of other- service recruiters on the 
Marine Corps’ recruiting efforts to obtain high-quality male contracts. 
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Per Capita Model 
w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 4 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran 
Population, RSS, Year, Qtr 0.0182 0.0336 
Per Capita Model 
w/o RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 5 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran 
Population 0.0161 .0316*** 
Per Capita Model 
w/alt. pay var. 
w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 6 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran 
Population, RSS, Year, Qtr 0.0187 0.0336 
Per Capita Model 
w/alt. pay var. w/o 
RSS Fixed Effects 
Table 7 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD 
recruiters/per capita, Unemployment Rate, 
Military Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran 





Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, 
Year, Qtr -0.0207 -0.0151 
Total Contracts 
Model w/o RSS 
Fixed Effects 
Table 9 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population 0.014 0.0203* 
Total Contracts 
Model w/alt. pay 
var. w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 10 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, 
Year, Qtr -0.0201 -0.0151 
Total Contracts 
Model w/alt. pay 
var. w/o RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 11 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military 
Civilian Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population 0.0146 0.0203* 
(a)Welsh(2008) 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Depending on how the model is specified, a 10% change in DoD recruiters will 
result in a -.02% or a +.18% increase in high-quality male contracts for the Marine Corps.  
We found that none of the eight models specified yielded statistically significant 
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coefficients for this variable.  However, when using a per-capita model as in Tables 4 
through 7), the elasticity of additional other-service recruiters, while small, are positive 
yet insignificant.  Similar results were found in previous contract supply models by 
Warner (1990), Jarosz and Stephens (1999), and Hogan et al. (2000).  The other services’ 
recruiters who are co-located with Marines actually have a more positive than negative 
impact on the number of high-quality male contracts for the Marine Corps, perhaps due 
to spillover effects of information on military.   
Studies by Jarosz and Stephens (1999) and Hogan et al. (2000) support the 
concept of complementary efforts between recruiters from different branches of service 
who operate within the same area (local market). Jarosz and Stephens (1999) found that 
in one particular local market, the number of high-quality male contracts produced by the 
Navy increased from 2% to 3.2% as a result of a 10% increase in Army recruiters who 
were recruiting there.  According to Hogan et al. (2000), the number of high-quality male 
contracts produced by the Army increased by 0.3% when a 10% increase in Navy 
recruiters began recruiting in the same zip code.  If a prospective applicant has a 
propensity to serve in the military, but favors sea duty to ground combat then joining the 
Navy could be considered an alternative to serving in the Army.  If the Army is not 
considered an alternative to the Navy then the elasticity in this study would mirror the 
findings by Hogan et al (2000) (Welsh, 2008).  
13. Summary of Veteran Population Elasticity 
Table 16 is a summary of the veteran population effects on high-quality male 
contracts as estimated by all eight models. 
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Per Capita Model 
w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 4 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD recruiters/per 
capita, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, Year, Qtr 0.0315 N/A 
Per Capita Model 
w/o RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 5 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD recruiters/per 
capita, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population .0400*** N/A 
Per Capita Model 
w/alt. pay var. 
w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 6 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD recruiters/per 
capita, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, Year, Qtr 0.0307 N/A 
Per Capita Model 
w/alt. pay var. w/o 
RSS Fixed Effects 
Table 7 
Marine Recruiters/per capita, DOD recruiters/per 
capita, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population .0053*** N/A 
Total Contracts 
Model w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 8 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, Year, Qtr 0.148 N/A 
Total Contracts 
Model w/o RSS 
Fixed Effects Table 
9 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay1 Ratio, Veteran Population .2715*** N/A 
Total Contracts 
Model w/alt. pay 
var. w/RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 10 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population, RSS, Year, Qtr 0.144 N/A 
Total Contracts 
Model w/alt. pay 
var. w/o RSS Fixed 
Effects Table 11 
Marine Recruiters, DOD recruiters, Youth 
Population, Unemployment Rate, Military Civilian 
Pay2 Ratio, Veteran Population .2690*** N/A 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; 
        ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The veteran population coefficient was consistently positive in all models.   
Depending on model specification, a 1% change in veteran population resulted in a 
0.03% to 0.27% increase in high-quality male contracts for the Marine Corps.  The 
models that do not account for fixed effects show the veteran population to be statistically 
significant at the 1% level and have the largest magnitude.  The range of increase in high-
quality male contracts due to veteran population is much smaller than the elasticity of 
2.1% found for the Navy in 2005 (Sladyk, 2008).    
 E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Eight different specifications of a basic enlistment supply model were estimated 
in this study.  In each model, the number of Marine recruiters has the largest impact on 
high-quality male applicants.  With the exception of the other-service recruiter and youth 
population variables, the other variables, although sensitive to model specification, all 
had positive coefficients.  In the two total contracts model specifications that used fixed 
effects, the coefficient for youth population was negative.  Additionally, although it 
seems counterintuitive that a 1% increase in youth population would estimate a 0.21% 
decrease in high-quality male contracts produced, this could be attributed to a youth 
population growing disproportionately faster than the size of the USMC recruiting force 




V.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we estimated high-quality male contract supply models for the 
Marine Corps at the Recruiting Sub-Station level. The data set used in the thesis was 
based on a data set initially collected by Welsh (2008). Our contribution was to 
incorporate new estimates of civilian youth wages that were provided to us by the Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command, and new estimates of state-level veteran populations taken 
from the American Community Survey.    Model estimations were based on RSS-level 
data covering 14 quarters from fiscal years 2004 through 2007.  Data on second quarter 
FY04 and fourth quarter FY07 were not available.  We used a log-log functional form 
and estimated the models using fixed effects techniques.  The results offered insight into 
the effects of various key predictors at the local geographic level on the production of 
high-quality male contracts for the Marine Corps. 
We found many similarities between the coefficients in our model and those in 
Welsh’s 2008 model.  Most similar were the effects of Marine recruiters and the local 
area unemployment rate, which were both statistically significant and in similar in 
magnitude to estimates in Welsh (2008).  The greatest difference in estimated coefficients 
between the two models was that of the military-to-civilian pay ratio.  This difference in 
estimated coefficients is likely due to the fact that in Welsh the wage data was based on 
civilian manufacturing wages at the state level for males of all ages.  The pay level for 
this demographic group is likely to systematically overstate the true opportunity cost of 
military enlistment to young males who are recent high school graduates. The new wage 
data utilized in our models was based on two different demographic groups:  (1) Males 
aged 18 to 25 with a high school degree, no college, and working at least 20 hours per 
week; and (2) males, aged 18 to 25 with a high school degree or some college, and 
working at least a 20 hours per week.   
The model created by Welsh in 2008 was used as a baseline; our goal was to 
improve upon its accuracy by introducing better wage data and veteran population data.  
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Although the new wage data was collected at the state level, it captures the age 
demographic which is more comparable to those individuals the Marine Corps seeks to 
enlist. This differs from the previous study that utilized civilian manufacturing wage data 
and captured the demographics ranging from age 18 to 65.     
The second new variable we introduced into the enlistment supply model was an 
estimate of the veteran population.  The veteran population is defined by the U. S. Census 
Bureau’s annual American Community Surveys as:  
a person 18 years old or over who has served (even for a short time), but is 
not now serving on active duty in the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 
Corps, or the Coast Guard, or who served in the U.S. Merchant Marines 
during World War II.  
Estimates of the veteran population were compiled from the American 
Community Surveys for the years 2003 through 2007.    The ACS data 
shows a steady decline of the veteran population in the U.S. during this 
period.   
Welsh’s 2008 enlistment supply study relied on state-level veteran population 
data from the 2000 census.  Because his sample was based on the years 2003 through 
2007, the veteran population variable was dropped from his model because there was no 
variation over time.  Our data was extracted from the American Community Survey data 
and provided the variation in this variable over time that was previously lacking.  
Although the veteran population data was not statistically significant in half of our 
models, it did have a positive coefficient suggesting that it proxies the enlistment 
propensity of high-quality males.   
Despite the improvements made to the Welsh 2008 model, the models we 
developed for this study also have a few key weaknesses that need to be addressed.  First, 
they do not contain a variable to represent the propensity of young males to enlist in the 
Marine Corps.  We mitigate this problem by assuming that propensities vary across RSS 
geographical areas, but remain fairly constant over time. Then we estimate RSS fixed 
effects models. Second, advertising data was not available at a Recruiting Sub-Station or 
Recruiting Station level.  Currently, the Marine Corps Recruiting Command’s advertising 
budget is only allocated down to the District (MCD) level.  If this data were available, it 
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could further guide the Marine Corps on how to better invest its advertising dollars. 
There are numerous and obvious reasons why the Marine Corps would invest in and 
utilize advertising as a recruiting tool.  Advertising generates awareness of the Marine 
Corps and what it has to offer; it attracts new applicants and potentially expands the 
number of poolees; and, it enables the Marine Corps to compete on a national level with 
private organizations and the other service branches. 
While the goal of advertising are clear, the Marine Corps’ ability to isolate and 
monetarily measure the outcome and overall effectiveness of its advertising campaigns is 
not so clear, especially when attempting to find a return on investment with regards to 
male contracts generated.  The Marine Corps’ advertising budget is tracked closely down 
to the MCD level and allocated each quarter of the fiscal year.  Advertising funds 
disbursed to the Recruiting Station-level, however, are not set to a predetermined amount, 
but more on an “as needed” basis.  The amount of funding each Recruiting Station 
requested varies and was not closely monitored in the past and is currently unavailable 
(WRR Advertising OIC, Phoncon 25 Oct 08).  Third, the model in its current form is not 
usable by the average Marine and will not likely be used or maintained in a manner that 
reaches its full potential unless it is used by an analyst with a background and working 
knowledge of regression analysis.  
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The civilian wage data would be more useful for predicting the enlistment 
propensity of high-quality male applicants if it were collected at the county level vice 
state level. We recommend continuing to work with CNA in an effort to gather more 
samples of high-quality male applicants.  The tracking of advertising data at the 
Recruiting Sub-Station or Recruiting Station level would be useful in determining the 
influence of advertising expenditures on high-quality male applicants.  We recommend 
the manpower planners develop an optimization model to calculate the number of 
recruiters necessary to obtain the desired number of high-quality male contracts.  We 
believe this can be accomplished by using the results of our fixed effects model in order 
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to capitalize on the effects of placing each Marine recruiter and RSS in the most 
productive markets (Jarosz and Stephens, 1999, p 54). 
CNA civilian youth wage estimates provide more flexibility than the standard 
civilian earnings data retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (CNA, 2008).  This is 
due to the fact that CNA used CPS-ORG files to estimate wages at the county level by 
age, gender, and education.  However, it was only collected at the state level for this 
study because the number of young males sampled was too small at lower geographical 
levels (county).  Our research has revealed that our civilian youth earnings variables 
(wage1 and wage2) have a positive effect on high-quality male contracts.  However, the 
variation in the wage estimates is small but parameter estimates are statistically 
significant in six out of eight of our models.  
The Marine Corps needs to hire an analyst with formal training in regression 
analysis to update and improve upon the contract supply models developed here.  
Without a thorough understanding of how to maintain, update, and interpret the models 
and data, the manpower planners could receive inaccurate data.  The Navy has a trained 
civilian analyst in charge of their enlisted goaling model.  This has added stability and 
continuity to the billet and the Navy Recruiting Command.  It may be in the Marine 
Corps’ best interest to consider following the Navy’s lead.  
The goal of this thesis was to produce a more dependable and user-friendly model 
that can be utilized by manpower planners to better forecast high-quality male applicants.  
Although the models developed in this study are not particularly user friendly to the 
average Marine, if they are updated by a trained analyst, the estimates could facilitate and 
focus the efforts of the recruiting force as it strives to accomplish the goal of increasing 
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